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CONVERGENCE IN INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS INSTITUTIONS: 
THE EMERGING ANGLO- AMERICAN MODEL?
ALEXANDER J. S. COLVIN AND OWEN DARBISHIRE*
At the outset of the Thatcher/Reagan era, the employment and 
labor law systems across six Anglo- American countries could be di-
vided into three pairings: the Wagner Act model of the United States 
and Canada; the Voluntarist system of collective bargaining and 
strong unions in the United Kingdom and Ireland; and the highly 
centralized, legalistic Award systems of Australia and New Zealand. 
The authors argue that there has been growing convergence in two 
major areas: First, of labor law toward a private ordering of employ-
ment relations in which terms and conditions of work and employ-
ment are primarily determined at the level of the enterprise; and 
second, of individual employment rights, toward a basket of mini-
mum standards that can then be improved upon by the parties. The 
greatest similarity is found in Canada, the United Kingdom, New 
Zealand, and Australia. Ireland retains a greater degree of public 
ordering, while the United States diverges in favoring the interests 
of employers over those of employees and organized labor. The au-
thors explore reasons for the convergence.
The elections of Ronald Reagan in the United States and Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom heralded a sea change in a conserva-
tive direction in the politics of the Anglo- American countries beginning in 
the 1980s. A central component of the conservative agenda that these lead-
ers ushered in was an effort to reduce the power and influence of labor 
unions, most famously with Reagan’s firing of the air traffic controllers in 
the 1981 PATCO strike and Thatcher’s defeat of the Mineworkers’ 1984–85 
strike. More broadly, labor union representation density went into a general 
decline across the Anglo- American countries (in addition to the United 
States and the United Kingdom, we include Canada, Australia, New Zea-
land, and Ireland within this grouping) from the 1980s onward, at varying 
rates, but with a common downward trajectory. In this article we examine to 
what degree labor and employment law systems changed similarly during 
*Alexander J. S. Colvin is a Professor at the ILR School, Cornell University. Owen Darbishire is a Uni-
versity Lecturer in the Said Business School, University of Oxford and a Fellow of Pembroke College. For 
information regarding the data and/or computer programs utilized for this study, please address corre-
spondence to Alex Colvin at ajc22@cornell.edu.
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this period. Do we see a common trajectory of change and, if so, what are 
the characteristics and nature of this change, and why has it occurred?
The question of how labor and employment law systems have changed in 
recent decades in the Anglo- American countries is important as a practical 
matter for understanding the state of employment relations in these coun-
tries. Such changes are also important elements in analyzing the broader 
comparative political economy of labor. Historically, comparative research 
has been concerned with the question of whether over time there will be a 
convergence of national industrial relations systems. In their pioneering 
comparative study, Industrialism and Industrial Man, Clark Kerr, John Dun-
lop, Frederick Harbison, and Charles Myers (1960) argued that national 
industrial relations systems worldwide were converging on something akin 
to an American- style model of collective bargaining due to the necessities of 
managing modern industrial factories, a proposition supported in an early 
empirical study by Stephen Kobrin (1977). By contrast, Harry Katz and Owen 
Darbishire (2000) argued that there was a converging divergence in which a 
range of different countries were seeing a similar phenomenon of growth in 
organizational- level variation in patterns of work and employment practices. 
At the same time, the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature in compara-
tive political economy emerged as a leading theoretical perspective for com-
parative analysis of the roles of labor and regulatory systems, arguing that 
there is a form of dual convergence on two different models (Hall and Sos-
kice 2001).
The VoC framework of Hall and Soskice (2001) distinguished between 
two paradigmatic capitalist types: the coordinated market economies (CMEs), 
exemplified by Germany but also including other continental European 
countries and Japan, and liberal market economies (LMEs), exemplified by 
the United States and the other Anglo- American countries. Each of these 
models is characterized by a particular set of relationships among the sys-
tems of corporate governance, inter- firm relationships, worker skill develop-
ment, and labor markets. The LME model is based on outsider governance 
and financing of corporations, market relations between firms, and, on the 
labor side, general rather than firm- specific skills, and competitive labor 
markets with relatively weak regulation.
The dichotomous nature of the VoC analysis has been subjected to im-
portant critiques, not least of which relating to the diversity of capitalist 
forms that exist (Amable 2003; Crouch 2005). Nevertheless, while Bruno 
Amable argued that greater heterogeneity exists, presenting five models of 
capitalism, the Anglo- American countries remain identified as a “highly ho-
mogenous cluster” (2003: 20), with the exception of Ireland which is cate-
gorized as a continental European form. The VoC framework presents a 
powerful conceptual model and, for Peter Hall and David Soskice (2001) in 
particular, an internal systemic logic to the nature of labor regulations can 
be found in the LME model, in which the flexibility and competitive labor 
markets reinforce a system of impatient capital seeking short- term rewards. 
Amable (2003) made the important distinction, however, between institutional 
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complementarities and structural isomorphism, which does not rest on 
functionalist arguments of a systemic logic. Instead, it allows that socially 
embedded institutions conform as a result of social norms or cultural dispo-
sition and recognizes that institutional designs are political compromises.
A common presumption of the diversity of capitalism approaches is that 
there has long been a general Anglo- American model of industrial and em-
ployment relations, characterized by a liberal market ordering. Adopting a 
comparative historical approach, we examine to what degree the consistent 
grouping of Anglo- American countries accurately describes the regulation 
of labor and employment. The trajectory of change in labor and employ-
ment law systems in the Anglo- American countries shows that while some 
truth is grounded in the VoC analysis, the picture is more complex, contin-
gent, and time- dependent than the initial VoC framework suggested. Con-
nected to this point, we use the term “Anglo- American” rather than “Liberal 
Market Economies” to describe the countries we are analyzing for two rea-
sons. First, the term allows us to be more precise about the set of countries 
we are examining. Although the two largely overlap, it is certainly conceiv-
able that non–Anglo- American countries could be classified as LMEs. Sec-
ond, we avoid the presumption that all of these countries do embody the 
characteristics of an LME model.
Historically, this categorization was not appropriate, and considerable 
variation occurred in the industrial relations systems among English- 
speaking countries. Indeed, three distinct models were in play: a Voluntarist 
system (with implicit state support) shared between Britain and Ireland; a 
unique Award system founded on conciliation and arbitration that prevailed 
in Australia and New Zealand; and the legally regulated Wagner Act frame-
work that was followed in both the United States and Canada. While these 
models shared some underpinnings, such as their common law founda-
tions, their distinctiveness was most notable, particularly given the many 
other respects in which these countries form a natural grouping, such as 
historical links, a common language, and political and economic similari-
ties, including an emphasis on shareholder- focused corporate governance.
We argue that over the past 30 years, however, there has been substantial 
convergence in the legal foundations of the industrial relations systems in 
these six countries as the Voluntarist and Award models have broken down 
and been replaced by new legal frameworks. A common “Anglo- American” 
model is now emerging, premised on a private ordering of industrial and 
employment relations practices, rather than the public ordering, which was 
an important dimension of the Voluntarist and Award models. By public or-
dering, we mean there were institutional mechanisms linking employment 
practices and terms and conditions across the economy and subjecting them 
to institutional influences beyond the individual firm or establishment. By 
contrast, private ordering of employment relations emphasizes the indepen-
dence of individual firms and establishments in determining employment 
practices, with outside influences limited to competitive labor market forces. 
The privately ordered mode of regulation is designed to assist managerial 
 at CORNELL UNIV on June 30, 2015ilr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
1050 ILRREVIEW
flexibility and to facilitate a divergence in employment practices between 
firms. This privately ordered model is underpinned by a common structure 
of basic “fairness standard” individual protections on such issues as dismissal 
and minimum terms and conditions, but unlike in the public ordering model 
this minimum basket of protections provides only a residual set of protec-
tions on a few specific issues.
Dynamics of Collective Representation Systems
Since the early 1980s there has been much turbulence and change in com-
parative systems of labor regulation and representation. This instability is 
most commonly associated with Thatcher and Reagan in Britain and the 
United States, respectively, though it has been at least as profound in Aus-
tralia and New Zealand. In contrast to other countries, the framework of 
labor law in the United States and Canada has exhibited remarkable stabil-
ity. In both countries, the system of industrial relations was firmly built 
around a private ordering of affairs, with representation and economic ne-
gotiations centered on the firm or enterprise.
The United States and Canada
In the United States, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) remains the 
statute enacted as the Wagner Act of 1935 and subsequently amended by 
the Taft- Hartley Act of 1947 and the Landrum- Griffin Act of 1959. More 
than half a century has passed since the last major amendments to the 
NLRA. Over time there has been some reinterpretation of the NLRA by the 
National Labor Relations Board, as well as by the courts, yet the basic legal 
framework of labor law remains the same. As when it was first enacted, the 
NLRA is structured around the principles of protection of the right to orga-
nize, requirement of majority support by employees for union certification, 
exclusive representation of bargaining units, duties to bargain in good faith 
with certified union representatives, and use of the economic weapons of 
strikes and lockouts to resolve impasses in bargaining. Labor laws governing 
public sector workers largely follow the same model as the NLRA, with some 
exceptions such as commonly limiting the right to strike and providing for 
interest arbitration as an alternative.
In the absence of legislative changes, the new uses made of existing provi-
sions of the law and the change in the perceived social contract that oc-
curred during the Reagan administration have been important. A particularly 
noteworthy example of this type of change in practices is the case of the 
permanent replacement of strikers, which was first facilitated by the 1938 
U.S. Supreme Court case of NLRB v. MacKay Radio (304 U.S. 333 (1938)). 
This decision had limited impact on industrial relations practice until the 
1981 PATCO dispute. Although that dispute involved the unusual situation 
of an illegal strike by public sector workers who were legally barred from 
striking, the willingness of President Reagan to fire and replace the strikers 
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sent a signal about the social acceptability of employers taking this type of 
aggressive stance toward organized labor. Significantly, during the following 
year in the 1982 Phelps- Dodge mine strike, a private sector employer used a 
similarly aggressive approach, this time based directly on the MacKay Radio 
precedent, by using permanent replacement workers to eliminate union 
representation at the mine (Rosenblum 1998). This became a model for ag-
gressive employer strategies in the 1980s and 1990s. While unionization has 
been declining in the United States for decades, employer attitudes have 
contributed to the decline from 22% in 1980 to just 11.8% in 2011 (Katz, 
Kochan and Colvin 2007; Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012).
The industrial relations system in Canada has also been stable and, as in 
the United States, is based on the Wagner Act model. The Wagner Act pro-
vided the template for the initial federal law governing labor relations in the 
1940s and also for subsequent provincial legislation in this area (Carter, 
England, Etherington, and Trudeau 2002).1 The various versions of Cana-
dian labor legislation incorporated key features of the Wagner Act model, 
including protection of the right to organize, majority union support re-
quired for certification, exclusive representation of bargaining units, duties 
to bargain on employment- related matters, and the availability of strike and 
lockout weapons to support bargaining.
At the same time, Canadian labor law has developed some distinct doc-
trines causing it to diverge from its southern neighbor, including lack of a 
bar on employer- dominated representation plans, use of card check and 
snap elections to determine majority representation status, self- enforceability 
of labor relations board orders, use of interest arbitration as an alternative 
to strikes for first contracts, and greater limitations on the use of permanent 
replacement workers in strikes or lockouts, as well as limitations on tempo-
rary replacements in some provinces. In general, these differences repre-
sent a more pro- labor slant to Canadian labor law compared to the United 
States. Although there have been a series of amendments to existing labor 
laws passed in the various Canadian provinces since the 1980s, these repre-
sent periodic shifts in power associated with changing provincial govern-
ments. Furthermore, these have occurred within a common general structure 
of regulation of labor relations, rather than entailing a broader transforma-
tion. Labor law in the federal jurisdiction in Canada has shown even greater 
stability over this period. The practice of industrial relations and labor law 
decision making in Canada also present a relatively high degree of continu-
ity over this period. This steadiness is reflected in the relative stability of 
union membership rates in Canada, with only a moderate decline from 
35.7% in 1980 to 30.8% in 2010 (Godard 2003; HRSD Canada 2011).
The relative stability in the North American countries under the Wagner 
Act model was reflected in the most recent major labor law reform proposals 
1 Labor law is an area of mixed legislative responsibility in Canada, with most workers covered by 
provincial legislation, but workers in certain key national industries, such as transportation, banking, and 
telecommunications, being under federal jurisdiction.
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debated in the U.S. Congress, the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), which 
was ultimately defeated. We see the general focus of potential changes in 
three key elements of the reforms proposed in EFCA: It would have strength-
ened remedies for unfair labor practices committed by employers during 
organizing campaigns, permitted certification of union representation on 
the basis of membership cards rather than a secret ballot vote, and provided 
for interest arbitration to determine first contracts if bargaining was at an 
impasse. The broad thrust was around an enhancement of protections for 
union organizing, but not a change in the fundamental structure of decen-
tralized, mostly enterprise- level, private collective bargaining. In this re-
spect, the proposed legislation would have moved the United States closer 
to a Canadian model of labor law, but without rejecting the basic Wagner 
Act framework.
The United Kingdom and Ireland
In contrast to this pattern of stability in North America, in Britain unions 
faced a concerted attack from 1979 to 1997 under the Thatcher and Major 
governments that included substantial labor law changes. From the begin-
ning of the 20th century the industrial relations system had been premised 
on a doctrine of collective laissez- faire. At the same time, however, govern-
ments consistently provided implicit support for unions and recognized 
their place in the economic order (Howell 2005). The result was a distinc-
tive regulatory approach of relying on voluntary collective bargaining to 
achieve a particular normative outcome (Davies and Freedland 1993). The 
thrust of the Thatcher reforms was to transform the role of unions and col-
lective bargaining within the economy and society. This transformation was 
achieved through a rebalancing of power. Among other effects, the Thatcher 
era legislation significantly narrowed the definition of a trade dispute and 
prohibited secondary picketing to create a tight private ordering model. 
Legislation also abolished the custom or requirement to recognize unions 
and the closed shop, and required compulsory ballots before strikes (Davies 
and Freedland 1993; Barlow 1997). The redefined place of unions was not 
only on the margins of the economy but also one of private ordering, par-
ticularly with the demise of historically important industry level or multi- 
employer collective bargaining (Brown and Walsh 1991). Multi- employer 
bargaining collapsed from covering 30% of the workforce and 18% of pri-
vate sector workplaces in 1980 to only 3% in 2004 (Brown, Bryson, and 
Forth 2009), reflecting the confinement of industrial relations to the indi-
vidual enterprise. Concomitantly, a dramatic drop occurred in the percent-
age of private sector workplaces in the United Kingdom, where unions were 
recognized, and a fall in union density from 52.9% in 1980 to 25.7% in 2011 
(Brownlie 2012).
The Labour Party elected in 1997 under Blair did not seek a reversal of 
this underlying philosophy. Rather, it retained the use of labor law to con-
fine collective action to the private sphere of ownership as an end in itself 
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and to achieve economic goals, with associated objectives of flexible out-
comes (Davies and Freedland 2007). A softening of the extremes of Thatcher- 
era legislation was introduced with the 1999 Employment Relations Act, 
which provided unions with recognition rights. These rights, however, are 
intended to operate only as a last resort, with a policy preference for volun-
tary agreements such that their impact has been largely symbolic (Peters 
2004; Dickens and Hall 2010). Furthermore, collective agreements can con-
tinue to be reached with non- independent unions supported by the em-
ployer, and these can even forestall the ability of unions to use the statutory 
recognition procedures. The emphasis remains firmly on a private order-
ing, for which enterprise- level decisions are regarded as key. The 2004 Em-
ployment Relations Act did respond (reluctantly) to the 2002 Wilson and 
Palmer judgments by the European Court of Human Rights to prevent in-
ducements to employees not to be a member of a union (Bogg 2005). Nev-
ertheless, the model remained one in which it was considered “essential 
that employers and individuals should retain their freedom to agree indi-
vidualised contracts” even when collective agreements exist (DTI 2003: 64). 
Additional collective rights, such as the 2005 implementation of the Euro-
pean Information and Consultation directive, had the potential to extend 
collective rights in both union and nonunion workplaces at the enterprise 
level. They were enacted, however, in a minimalist manner and were re-
stricted in scope (Terry 2010), so avoiding challenge to managerial flexibil-
ity or the private ordering model.
Ireland has trodden a path different from Britain, despite their common 
industrial relations heritage. While the constitution provides the right to 
join a trade union, it does not give a corresponding obligation on employ-
ers to recognize or bargain with them. Nevertheless, the role of unions 
within the public sphere was long accepted, with the 1946 Industrial Rela-
tions Act (and amendments in 1969 and 1976) promoting harmonious in-
dustrial relations as a key objective (Kerr 1991). The voluntarist foundation 
of Irish industrial relations without collective bargaining rights has been re-
tained and labor law has been comparatively stable. The 1990 Industrial 
Relations Act, for example, ultimately avoided introducing a positive right 
to strike, but retained the “immunities” approach dating from 1906.
What has been unique in Ireland is the great expansion of the role of 
unions in public ordering of the economy and society, through successive 
national level “Partnership” agreements from 1987.2 These agreements have 
corporatist dimensions and have established pay guidelines, addressed is-
sues of public policy (such as taxation), and progressively expanded to broader 
social issues involving community and voluntary organizations (Teague and 
Donaghey 2004). For unions, this partnership approach was introduced to 
2 Although the 22 years of formal centralized collective bargaining under the national partnerships 
ended in December 2009 in the face of economic turmoil, both the Croke Park agreement in the public 
sector and the private sector Protocol on orderly industrial relations agreed between the IBEC and ITUC 
in 2010 and 2011 have continued, for the time being, national coordination of bargaining.
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protect against Thatcherite neoliberalism and to strengthen union legiti-
macy (D’Art and Turner 2005). This public ordering with respect to pay 
setting significantly facilitated Ireland’s remarkable economic success (Bac-
caro and Simoni 2007; McGuinness, Kelly, and O’Connell 2010), notwith-
standing current economic difficulties.
Even during this period, however, dimensions of private ordering regula-
tions have been evident. The 1990 Act, for example, narrowed the defini-
tion of a trade dispute to the enterprise, placed corresponding restrictions 
on secondary strike action, and required prestrike ballots (Rasnic 2007). 
Furthermore, social partnership has been restricted in scope and, in con-
trast to traditional models of corporatism, has not been institutionalized at 
the enterprise level. Indeed, partnership has largely failed to take hold at 
the firm level resulting in a system of “truncated social partnership” (Roche 
2007: 192). There has been tacit governmental support facilitating greater 
private ordering of employment practices at the firm level and “organisa-
tions have had more or less complete autonomy to pursue corporate strate-
gies of their choosing” (Teague and Donaghey 2009: 67; also see Teague 
and Hann 2008). Likewise, the public policy of encouraging union recogni-
tion among foreign firms was reversed in the mid- 1980s as the Irish Devel-
opment Agency (IDA) adopted a deliberate strategy to attract investment 
from multinational companies, particularly from the United States. This 
trend continued with the successful opposition of the employers’ associa-
tions and IDA to giving unions formal recognition procedures when consid-
ered prior to the 2001 Industrial Relations Act, though it gave some rights 
to refer disputes on terms and conditions in nonunion firms to the Labour 
Court (Teague 2006). In practice, however, this right is only of significance 
when terms and conditions fall significantly short of accepted standards. 
Nonunion collective agreements can also inhibit this, even if (as in the case 
of Ryanair) they are conditional upon the company remaining union- free 
(Sheehan 2007).
Traditional pluralist industrial relations has been in retreat as even do-
mestic firms have been increasingly willing to resist the suasion of the La-
bour Court to recognize unions (Gunnigle, O’Sullivan, and Kinsella 2002), 
again reflecting the decline in the public ordering of industrial relations. 
The result has been that “the regulatory system affecting workplaces has 
become more liberal and permissive of a wider spectrum of employment 
practices” (Roche 2007: 206), with no restrictions on firms varying employ-
ment conditions by individual contract. The implementation of the Euro-
pean Information and Consultation directive also reflected a minimalist 
enactment seeking to perpetuate a voluntarist model, while facilitating the 
ability of employers to establish alternative structures at the enterprise level. 
The impact has, consequently, been minimal (NCPP 2009). Nevertheless, 
while density has fallen to 34% overall and 20% in the private sector (CSO 
Ireland 2010), there has also “opened up a rights- based dimension to Irish 
employment relations” (Donaghey and Teague 2007: 31). Some 14 separate 
employment laws have been introduced, supporting individual rights, in-
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cluding a national minimum wage, protection of part- time employees, work-
ing time, and expanded maternity rights (ibid.; see also Teague 2006).
Australia and New Zealand
The Arbitration and Award systems that developed in the 1890s and early 
1900s in New Zealand and Australia were premised on an understanding of 
the legitimate public ordering of industrial relations extending into encour-
aging union membership (through union preference clauses), dispute reso-
lution, and the settlement of terms and conditions of employment such that 
they were “fair and reasonable” (McCallum 2006). In the 1907 Harvester 
case, Justice Higgins came to define this through the question “What are the 
normal needs of the average employee regarded as a human being living in 
a civilized community?” (Ex Parte H.V. McKay [Harvester Case] 2 CAR 1). 
Relating this to the humblest worker living in a household of five, the social 
dimension was evident. Progressively, the regulatory system expanded to 
 include detailed industry and occupational awards specifying terms and 
conditions of employment as well as establishing norms on issues such as 
working hours, holidays, physical working conditions, and periods of notice. 
All such employment practices were deemed to be central to the public or-
dering of industrial relations. A unique feature, however, was that this pub-
lic ordering developed through the Arbitration and Conciliation system, 
rather than through legislation, even if the government was frequently an 
interested party in award decisions as test cases. In both countries, the sys-
tem was supported by high trade tariffs such that the institutions provided 
for “social protection and full employment in a wage- based welfare state” 
(Kelly 1995: 334; also see Castles 1988).
Changes in the Award system began most dramatically in New Zealand in 
the 1990s. Although the progress of “Rogernomics” in New Zealand in the 
1980s had brought much economic liberalization, reform of the labor mar-
ket with the 1987 Labour Relations Act was more limited and in 1990 almost 
all registered awards still “contained both blanket coverage and union mem-
bership provisions” (Harbridge and McCaw 1991: 6). Against this backdrop, 
the 1991 Employment Contracts Act (ECA) represented a radical break with 
the public order model and was premised fundamentally on individual em-
ployment contracts in the absence of any concept of an imbalance of power. 
The ECA pushed all agreements to the enterprise, in spite of some 93% of 
private sector employees having been covered by multi- employer agree-
ments in 1990 (Honeybone 1997), even if supplemented with second- tier 
bargaining. The ECA neither mentioned unions nor required recognition, 
removed the right of unions to represent members or to achieve exclusive 
representation, and allowed individual, union, and nonunion (whether in-
dependent or not) contracts on an equal basis (Hince and Vranken 1991; 
Dannin 1997). This transformed the system to one of private ordering, lead-
ing to a collapse of union membership and density and the determination 
of conditions at the enterprise level (Lansbury, Wailes, and Yazbeck 2007).
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The Employment Relations Act (ERA) 2000 represented a rebalancing of 
power in an attempt to remove the neoliberal ideology of the ECA, facilitate 
union recognition, and build a cooperative employment relationship to 
achieve a high- wage, high- skill economy (Wilson 2010). An explicit objec-
tive of the Act was the promotion of collective bargaining, while recognizing 
the inherent inequality of bargaining power in the employment relation-
ship. As with the Wagner Act, unions gain exclusive bargaining rights, and 
enterprise agreements can be reached only with independent unions. Good 
faith bargaining was introduced and, as extended in 2004, requires that em-
ployers reach an agreement in the absence of a “genuine reason, based on 
reasonable grounds” not to (s33, ERA 2000); has the possibility for terms to 
be imposed in cases of bad faith; and requires that good faith extend to the 
ongoing employment relationship with employers prohibited from under-
mining unions or collective bargaining. The ERA also prohibits worker re-
placement or reassigning existing employees in case of a strike.
Nevertheless, the ERA remains entirely consistent with the private order-
ing model. Although multi- employer bargaining is permitted, this is not 
supported by good faith requirements that remain at the enterprise level, 
while any industrial action has to be authorized independently at every 
workplace by ballots. Collective agreements cover only union members, can-
not be passed on automatically to nonmembers, and individual variation is 
permitted and prevalent, even against the backdrop of a union agreement. 
The impact of the ERA has not reversed the decline in union density in New 
Zealand, which fell from 45% in 1985 to 19% in 2009, with just 9% in the 
private sector (Blumenfeld 2010: 47).
In Australia, the transformation was more gradual, beginning with the 
1993 Industrial Relations Reform Act and particularly the 1996 Workplace 
Relations Act (WRA). Although enterprises were the historic location for 
limited over- award bargaining, these acts progressively decentralized and 
concentrated industrial relations at the workplace. In 1990 awards covered 
80% of the workforce with 67% reliant on awards for their terms and condi-
tions (FWA 2010: 59). By 2008 only 17% were reliant on awards. Beyond 
this, the Acts allowed individual contracts and nonunion collective agree-
ments; outlawed the closed shop, which had covered 54% of Australian 
workers in 1990 (de Turberville 2007); and did not provide any mechanism 
for union recognition or good faith bargaining. Strikes and lockouts were 
legalized, though secondary action and the ability to engage in pattern bar-
gaining were severely restricted under the 1996 WRA. The impact of the 
Award system and the public ordering declined, though 2,300 federal and 
1,700 state awards (Gray 2005) continued to establish the floor to collective 
and individual bargaining at the enterprise level.
One aspect of this change was an increasing federalization of Australian 
labor law. In contrast to the earlier system in which state- level laws and 
awards played a more important role, the federal government asserted its 
authority to regulate labor relations matters under its corporations power 
in the Australian constitution (Lansbury and Wailes 2011). After the initial 
period of more gradual change, in 2005 Australian legislation shifted 
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dramatically to an extreme private ordering of employment relations with 
the Work Choices Act (McCallum 2007). This shift effectively ended the ar-
bitration system and the role of awards. It also provided unions no right to 
recognition, minimal access to the workplace, and promoted nonunion 
agreements while allowing employers to offer individual agreements on a 
take- it- or- leave- it basis. Remarkably, Work Choices amended Section 421 of 
the Workplace Relations Act (WRA) 1996 to prohibit the use of pattern bar-
gaining, with the objective of requiring bargaining and agreements to re-
flect the “individual circumstances” of each business. Furthermore, in 
contrast to the distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects in 
the United States or absence of restrictions in Britain or Ireland, bargaining 
over issues that were not deemed to be “matters pertaining” to the employ-
ment relationship had already been prohibited by Section 869 of the WRA 
1996. Such issues included union involvement in the workplace, additional 
unfair dismissal protections (which were removed from workers in compa-
nies with fewer than 100 employees), and the hiring of agency or contract 
workers. As an extreme imposition of a private ordering model, this Act was 
designed to weaken unions and to ensure that any bargaining would reflect 
the circumstances of the individual enterprise. Unions would be obliged to 
respond to the enterprise- specific proposals of the employer, creating maxi-
mum flexibility. While minimum wage legislation replaced the Award sys-
tem, the legislation imposed significant constraints on the ability of unions 
to strike while allowing offensive lockouts (Briggs 2007).
With the defeat of the Howard government in the 2007 federal elections, 
in which industrial relations reform was a major issue, Australian industrial 
relations policy underwent another shift. In 2009, the Rudd- led Labour 
Party government passed the new Fair Work Act, which reversed some, 
though not all, of the changes that had been enacted under the previous 
Work Choices Act. Most notably, it abolished statutory individual contracts 
and returned the focus to collective bargaining as the primary mechanism 
for establishing terms and conditions of employment (Lansbury 2009). Nev-
ertheless, it explicitly retained strong emphasis on private enterprise- level 
bargaining as exemplified by the continuation of the remarkable symbolic 
prohibition against pattern bargaining, restrictions on secondary boycotts, 
and the confinement of bargaining to matters pertaining to the employ-
ment relationship (continuing to exclude, for example, constraints on man-
agerial prerogative to hire agency or contract workers).
The legislation includes a mixture of expanded rights for unions and 
some continued limitations: Employees have the right to be represented in 
collective negotiations and a “majority support determination” can be 
granted by Fair Work Australia on the basis of a simple petition, while good- 
faith bargaining was established (except in cases of multi- employer bargain-
ing in which industrial action is also not permitted).3 No distinction was 
3 An exception relates to the low- wage bargaining stream, in which facilitated multi- employer bargaining 
can be established when no history of collective negotiations exists, inspired by the example of a similar 
system in the Canadian province of Quebec (Vranken 2010).
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made, however, between union and nonunion agreements: All agreements 
are made between the employer and employees (rather than with the bar-
gaining representative), and employees are free to select their bargaining 
representatives or to bargain directly provided they are independent of the 
employer. That is, no exclusive representation rights are in effect, and mul-
tiple bargaining agents are permitted, though agreements apply to all in the 
bargaining unit.4 The private ordering is evident in that voluntary unionism 
extends into an individualistic model of collective bargaining in which the 
union is not regarded as representing the collective interests of employees. 
Union density has remained low, having fallen from 50% in 1982 to 18.4% 
in 2011.5
Overall, the Fair Work Act strengthens the position of unions, including 
union representatives having rights of access to workplaces even where they 
do not have existing members, while retaining strong constraints against 
industrial action. The most significant reintroduction of a public ordering 
occurred with the 22 Modern Awards, which establish general employment 
standards and minimum terms and conditions. These have extensive appli-
cation, such that all collective agreements have to be judged “better off 
overall” by Fair Work Australia, the regulator (O’Neill, Goodwin, and Neilsen 
2008).
Comparison of Changes in Collective Representation
The changes in labor law systems that we have described for the six coun-
tries in this study are summarized in Table 1. The pattern of labor law changes 
has led to a decline in the public ordering of industrial relations and a con-
vergence in the realm of collective labor rights, albeit with differences across 
the countries remaining. Union recognition rights are now the norm, 
though with operational differences. While Canadian labor law facilitates 
organizing through card check and snap elections, the slow process and ag-
gressive employer campaigning in the United States inhibits the ability of 
the unions to gain bargaining rights. The British system represents a hybrid 
with a statutory recognition procedure serving as a legal backstop to a sys-
tem designed to operate predominantly through voluntary recognition 
(Dukes 2008). Meanwhile both Australian and New Zealand labor law now 
feature comparatively easy acquisition of recognition and representation, as 
well as duties to bargaining in good faith, though without exclusive union 
bargaining. The dramatic change under the Work Choices Act to curtail rec-
ognition or good faith bargaining rights in Australia was extreme, though was 
ultimately not sustained following the change in government and enactment 
4 For example, in Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union v Bansley Pty Ltd (FWA 797) 2011, 
there were 23 bargaining representatives, including 3 unions and 20 employees, either appointed or self- 
nominated.
5 Australian Bureau of Statistics 1982, Trade Union Members, Australia Cat No. 6325.0, Canberra; 2011 
Employee Earnings, Benefits and Trade Union Membership Cat No. 6310.0.
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of the Fair Work Act of 2009. This was similarly true in New Zealand with the 
replacement of the highly individualistic 1991 Employment Contracts Act 
with the more union- friendly 2000 Employment Relations Act. Ireland stands 
apart in not having recognition rights or a duty to bargain. The preservation 
of the Voluntarist model in Ireland has occurred in spite of continuing de-
clines in union membership and the national partnership agreements.
While the United States prohibits nonunion collective representation 
through 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, this representation is allowed in other coun-
tries. In Canada, nonunion collective representation is allowed by the ab-
sence of an equivalent to the 8(a)(2) ban in Canadian versions of the 
Wagner Act model. In Australia, the Fair Work Act of 2009 draws no distinc-
tion between union and nonunion collective agreements, although as in 
New Zealand, bargaining representatives have to be independent of the em-
ployer, which is not the case in either Britain or Ireland. Each of Britain, 
Ireland, Australia and, most starkly, New Zealand allow individual contracts 
to diverge from any collective agreement. New Zealand has, however, estab-
lished the strongest good faith provisions, which are absent in only Britain 
and Ireland.
Britain and Ireland have retained a basic structure of immunities as op-
posed to a right to strike. By contrast, the introduction of a system of rights 
to strike in aid of collective bargaining in Australia and New Zealand (which 
had historically been contrary to the Arbitration and Award system in the-
ory, if not in practice) has meant a formal convergence with the North 
American model that has always contained this explicit legal support for the 
right to strike in support of bargaining. Some differences remain in this 
area as well. In Britain, Ireland, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, autho-
rization for strikes requires ballots of differing degrees of complexity 
whereas such requirements are absent in the United States. Permanent re-
placement of strikers is permitted in the United States, while this is true in 
most of Canada only for temporary replacements. In Britain, from 2004 on-
ward, workers on strike have received protection from dismissal for 12 
weeks. New Zealand has strong restrictions even on internal worker reas-
signment, though such protections are absent in Ireland. Overall though, in 
the recognition and regulation of strikes as the primary economic weapon 
of unions in support of collective bargaining, we see a general trend of con-
vergence across the Anglo- American countries, paralleling the convergence 
in other areas of labor law and collective representation.
Individual Employment Rights
As in the area of collective labor representation, when we look at individual 
employment rights regimes we see a substantial shift in the structure of reg-
ulation in some of the countries examined, but less so in others. Our com-
parison here focuses on three basic areas of individual employment rights: 
minimum wage and hours laws, general benefits and leave entitlements, 
and unfair dismissal. These three areas of employment rights have been 
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used previously among comparisons of employment and labor standards 
(e.g., Block and Roberts 2000). We focus on them in particular because they 
capture important aspects of legal regulation of the employment contract 
and relationship, as opposed to more general social welfare systems that 
may or may not be tied to the particular employment relationship (e.g., 
health or unemployment insurance).
Minimum Wage and Hours Laws
Minimum wage and hours laws have been a basic component of employ-
ment standards regulation in the North American countries since the mid- 
20th century. In the United States, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 
established a national minimum wage and entitlements to overtime pay 
(time- and- a- half of regular pay) for work in excess of 40 hours a week. This 
policy has remained a stable part of U.S. employment standards law since 
that time. The Canadian provinces enacted similar minimum wage and 
overtime pay regimes relatively soon after the United States, which have 
again remained the policy though with some expansion to include addi-
tional minimum terms of employment such as vacation leave entitlements.
Employment law in the United Kingdom and Ireland was historically 
shared prior to Irish independence and lacked provisions for a generalized 
minimum wage, though they had a long tradition of measures that acted as 
a component of state support for collective bargaining as part of a public 
ordering framework. These included the 1891 Fair Wage Resolution to 
 ensure government contracts did not undermine terms and conditions in 
industry collective bargaining and the 1909 Trade Boards Act, which estab-
lished minimum pay on an industry- wide basis for unorganized workers. In 
the United Kingdom, the 1945 Wages Councils Act enabled terms and con-
ditions to be set above a basic floor. Together with Schedule 11 of the Em-
ployment Protection Act they allowed for a going- rate, often determined by 
collective agreements, to be extended to unorganized workers. Historically 
these covered 10 to 15% of the workforce (Katz and Darbishire 2000: 75; 
Deakin and Green 2009), though the Thatcher governments progressively 
abolished them by 1993. Under the Labour government of Tony Blair, how-
ever, the United Kingdom introduced the general National Minimum Wage 
Act in 1998, establishing a common minimum consistent with a private or-
dering model.
The counterparts to Wages Councils in Ireland were the Joint Labour 
Committees (JLC). Enacted under the 1946 Industrial Relations Act, these 
have continued to provide protection to pay and core working conditions 
for vulnerable workers in certain low- paid sectors, such as agriculture, retail, 
and hotels. The Irish social partnership system has enabled them to survive 
along with limited Registered Employment Agreements (REA), which can 
extend “representative” collective agreements to cover sectors, such as con-
struction. In 2010 this had rates as high as the equivalent of US$20.55 for 
experienced electrical contractors. Together, the JLCs and REAs protect 
some 15% of the private sector workforce (Duffy and Walsh 2011). Ireland 
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complemented these historic, but limited scope, JLCs and REAs by intro-
ducing its first national minimum wage law in 2000, which drew upon the 
United Kingdom’s model (Teague 2006).6
In Australia and New Zealand, the centralized Award systems went fur-
ther than the employment standards laws in other countries by establishing 
generally applicable terms and conditions of employment through awards, 
including standard pay levels on an industry or occupational basis, at a level 
that resulted in a wage- based welfare state. While a federal minimum wage 
in Australia was implemented in 1966 (Stokes 1973), it was the higher fed-
eral and state Awards that underpinned wages. With the abolition of the 
Award system a general minimum wage law was introduced under Work 
Choices, drawing on the U.K. model. The Fair Work Act partially reversed 
this trend through the restoration of 10 national employment standards es-
tablishing minimum protections in areas such as hours of work, vacations, 
and redundancy pay. Furthermore, the legacy of the Award system has been 
restored with 122 Modern Awards that provide a second, higher, and more 
detailed safety net of regulations on work and employment conditions on 
an industry or occupational basis for those earning less than AUS$113,800 
in July 2010 (approx. US$104,500 in 2010 exchange rates). While the mini-
mum wage is high by international standards, reflecting the historic “fair-
ness standard,” it has low impact: Modern Awards provide significantly 
greater vertical coverage as well as providing protections to casual workers 
through 25% casual worker wage premiums.
New Zealand was one of the earliest adopters of a minimum wage, with 
legislation dating from 1894 and the Minimum Wage Act from 1945 (Pa-
checo 2007). The Awards system created a more granulated effect, however: 
Awards had a coverage of 67% in 1990 (Bray and Walsh 1998: 362) and ex-
isted in a multi- tiered system of protections that included the minimum 
wage, occupational awards, general wage adjustments, collective agreements 
at the enterprise, and blanket coverage provisions. With the ECA in 1991 
the minimum wage protections operated alone. The significant change in 
both Australia and New Zealand has been the shift in the mechanism for 
wage regulation away from the establishment of general wage levels and to-
ward a system of minimum wages with most employment relationships typi-
cally involving the establishment of higher wage levels, either through direct 
employer wage setting or through collective or individual negotiations.
Therefore, some significant convergence in minimum wage provisions 
has transpired. As Table 2 shows, however, the comparative protection given 
by the minimum wage is what stands out. The rate varies from US$7.25 in 
the United States in 2011 to the equivalent of US$9.88 in Australia.7 The dif-
ference in protection as a percentage of median wages is substantial: In New 
6 In July 2011 the procedure for issuing Employment Regulation Orders under the 1946 Industrial 
Relations Act was deemed unconstitutional by the High Court, requiring legislation to rectify this.
7 All minimum wage rates have been drawn from the U.K.’s National Minimum Wage: Low Pay Commission 
Report 2012 (April), Table A3.1, p. 174, adjusted using OECD purchasing power parity rates from 
September 2011 to U.S. dollars. The data for Canada are a weighted average of provinces.
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Zealand this equates to 59% of median wages while Ireland and, in particu-
lar, Australia retain multitiered mechanisms of wage support. The United 
States is the outlier, providing the lowest protection at just 38% of median 
wages.
General Benefits and Leave Entitlements
Most of the Anglo- American countries also provide basic entitlement to pa-
rental leave (Table 2). Indeed, substantial similarities occur in the combina-
tions of part paid leave, with government funding support, and part unpaid 
leave. The convergence is shown insofar as New Zealand introduced job 
protection for those entitled to parental leave in 1987 and paid leave in 
2002, while in Australia the more limited policy of only unpaid leave evolved 
first by the addition of a universal AUS$5,000 “baby bonus” in 2004, and in 
2010, 18 weeks of paid parental leave. While Canada has the longest paid 
leave, the United States stands out for having by far the most limited bene-
fit. It provides only 12 weeks unpaid leave under the Family and Medical 
Leave Act, which is further limited to larger employers and as a result covers 
less than half (around 46%) of the private sector workforce (Waldfogel 1999).
A similar pattern holds in the area of minimum standards for vacation or 
holiday leave. Most of the Anglo- American countries have generally similar 
minimum vacation and public holiday entitlements enacted in employment 
law (Table 2). In the United Kingdom, Ireland, New Zealand, and Australia, 
employees are entitled to 4 weeks of vacation and between 8 and 11 public 
holidays. Australia also provides for additional extended periods of long ser-
vice leave (after 7 to 15 years employment with the same employer) under 
various state or federal awards. In Canada, the amount of leave entitlement 
varies by province, though with 8 to 10 public holidays and 2 weeks of vaca-
tion being a common minimum entitlement.8 The major exception is again 
the United States, where no minimum vacation entitlement or paid public 
holidays are specified in employment law.
Unfair Dismissal
In the area of unfair dismissal, we find across most of the Anglo- American 
countries the establishment of basic substantive and procedural protections 
against wrongful termination of employment. In the United Kingdom, em-
ployees have had legal protections against unfair dismissal since 1971, en-
forceable through the Employment Tribunals system, while in Ireland these 
were introduced in 1977. In Australia, general protections against unfair 
dismissal emerged first in the states from 1972 and were then included in 
federal Awards from 1982, before having general effect through legislation 
in 1993 (Chapman 2003). One of the major features of the 2005 Work 
8 Leave in some provinces rises with years of service, for example, 2 weeks initially and then 3 weeks 
after 5 years of service in British Columbia and Alberta.
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Choices legislation was the removal of unfair dismissal protections in firms 
of fewer than 100 employees, excluding 56% of the workforce, though these 
were restored by the Fair Work Act (FWAEM 2008). In each of these coun-
tries the protections extend to rights of compensation in cases of redun-
dancy, and the protection of terms and conditions in cases of the transfer of 
businesses or contracting out of services. New Zealand provided protection 
against unfair dismissal from 1973, though only for union members, thus 
covering 60% of the workforce (Anderson 1997). This provision was ex-
tended as a basic individual employment right in the 1991 ECA, though no 
rights to redundancy compensation are available, and only vulnerable work-
ers have protection in the case of business transfers, which was introduced 
in 2004 (Walker 2007).
North America presents a contrast in this area. Canadian employment 
law provides for protection against unfair dismissal through a combination 
of employment standards legislation and common law rights against wrong-
ful dismissal. Rather than reinstatement, however, the standard remedy for 
unfair dismissal in Canadian employment law (as in our other countries) is 
damages equivalent to lost salary or wages for a period equal to what the 
employer should have provided in reasonable notice before dismissal (Col-
vin 2006). This can be a substantial amount, as much as one month per year 
of service under common law rights. In the area of unfair dismissal, the 
United States is again the outlier. The general employment law in the 
United States continues to be employment- at- will, under which an employer 
may dismiss an employee for “good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all,” 
without any requirement of notice or severance pay. The most important 
exception to this rule is that U.S. law does prohibit discrimination in em-
ployment (in such areas as gender, race, age, and disability). Employment 
discrimination claims can be pursued through the general court system, 
commonly involving jury trials with the potential for much larger damage 
awards than found in other countries. Given concerns over major damage 
awards if an employment decision is found to be tinged by discriminatory 
motives, American employers tend to exercise a degree of caution in dis-
missal decision making that does not reflect the seemingly high degree of 
flexibility inherent in the employment- at- will rule (Colvin 2006).
Comparison of Individual Employment Rights
What is striking in this comparison of employment laws and standards sum-
marized in Table 2 is the relative similarity in the minimum standards to 
which individual employees in most of these countries are entitled. Whereas 
Canada, the United States, and New Zealand had general minimum wage 
laws before the 1980s, now all countries have adopted them with levels rang-
ing from US$7.25 to $9.88. Most countries provide for a minimum paid an-
nual vacation entitlement of around 2 to 4 weeks, plus 8 to 11 days off for 
public holidays. Maternity and parental leaves are generally around one year 
with some portion of this paid. All countries provide for legal protection 
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against discrimination in employment. Almost all countries provide unfair 
dismissal protection, with employees entitled to compensation if dismissed 
without notice or cause. In general, an employee could move between two 
of these countries to take up a new job and expect that the minimum level 
of employment standards to which he or she would be entitled would be 
relatively similar.
The major outlier in this area is the United States. Some areas of U.S. 
employment law do parallel that of the other Anglo- American countries. 
With regards to employment discrimination, the United States was a leader 
with the other Anglo- American countries adopting laws paralleling Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and subsequent American discrimination 
laws (McCallum 2007). Employees in the United States have minimum wage 
protections as in the other countries, albeit at a lower level equivalent to just 
38% of the median wage with low levels of enforcement. More significant 
divergence exists in the continued adherence to the employment- at- will 
rule in the United States, denying any protection against unfair dismissal or 
any entitlement to reasonable notice or compensation for dismissal. A fur-
ther substantial divergence is the lack of entitlement to either annual vaca-
tion leave or paid sick leave. Finally, U.S. employment law standards are 
much more limited than in other Anglo- American countries in maternity or 
parental leave: only a limited segment of American private sector workers 
are entitled to just 12 weeks of unpaid leave.
Convergence on a New Anglo- American Model
If we had conducted a similar comparison of the six countries examined in 
this study in 1980 at the outset of the Thatcher/Reagan era, the analysis 
would have emphasized the significant variation that existed, with the Anglo- 
American countries divided into three pairings: the Wagner Act industrial 
relations systems of the United States and Canada; the Voluntarist system of 
collective bargaining and strong unions in the United Kingdom and Ire-
land; and the highly centralized, legalistic Award systems of Australia and 
New Zealand. Indeed, such a historical perspective contradicts the idea that 
there has been a long- standing Anglo- American model of liberal market 
economic ordering as has sometimes been suggested, such as in the variet-
ies of capitalism literature (Hall and Soskice 2001). Looking at the current 
state of the labor and employment law systems in these six countries, how-
ever, we argue that there has been growing convergence in two major areas.
Convergence has occurred in the area of labor rights toward private or-
dering of employment relations and away from the idea of work and em-
ployment being a matter subject to public ordering. By private ordering, we 
mean the idea that work and employment terms and conditions are primar-
ily determined at the level of the individual organization, whether through 
collective bargaining between unions and employers at the organizational 
level, through individual negotiations, or through unilateral employer es-
tablishment of the terms and conditions of employment. The shift away from 
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public ordering of work and employment is most dramatic in the cases of 
Australia and New Zealand, where the publicly established system of central-
ized awards has given way to organizational- level ordering of employment 
relations through workplace or individual agreements. In the United King-
dom, the shift to greater private ordering is most evident in the breakdown 
of multi- employer collective bargaining and industry- wide standards en-
forced by strong unions, together with the growth of employer determina-
tion of conditions at the enterprise level. By contrast, the much lesser degree 
of structural change in the labor rights area in North America reflects the 
historical situation that the Wagner Act model was from the outset a model 
built around the idea of private ordering. The legal regulation of primarily 
enterprise- level union organizing and collective bargaining is premised on 
the idea that the individual organization is the appropriate level for deter-
mination of work and employment conditions. The areas where we have 
seen change in North America, such as the breakdown of multi- employer 
and pattern bargaining, reflect a deterioration of a superstructure of partial 
public ordering built on top of the basic Wagner Act model during the 
1950s through the 1970s and the decline in unionization rates.
Turning to the area of employment rights, we also see a convergence 
across the six Anglo- American countries toward a model in which the role 
of employment law is to establish a basket of minimum standards that are 
built into the employment relationship, which can then be improved upon 
by the parties. Again, the shift has been particularly dramatic in the cases of 
Australia and New Zealand, with the previous Award model involving the 
establishment of relatively generous general terms and conditions of em-
ployment being replaced, in part, by employment laws that establish a more 
basic set of minimum standards. Although additional wages or benefits could 
always be provided above the award levels under the old system, now the 
minimum standards are a more limited set of basic protections rather than 
a broader foundation to build upon as in the past. In the United Kingdom 
and Ireland by contrast, the shift has been toward a greater formalization of 
minimum standards of employment through expanded employment laws, 
in contrast to the earlier system of voluntarism. Again change in this area 
has been less significant in North America because the system of employ-
ment regulation was historically based on the concept of employment law as 
establishing a minimum basket of employment standards, through the Fair 
Labor Standards Act in the United States and its Canadian counterparts.
Within these general trends, we do see some variation in the degree of 
convergence on these models of labor and employment rights regulation 
across the Anglo- American countries. The strongest degree of similarity in 
adoption of the private ordering in labor rights and the minimum standards 
basket in employment rights is found in four of the countries: Canada, the 
United Kingdom, New Zealand and, following the replacement of the 2005 
Work Choices Act with the 2009 Fair Work Act, Australia. Each of these coun-
tries has adopted labor laws that favor organizational- level economic order-
ing, but with reasonably substantial protections of trade union organizing 
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and bargaining rights, and a set of minimum employment standards that 
include minimum wage, basic leave entitlements, and unfair dismissal pro-
tections. One interesting indicator of the degree of convergence across 
these four countries is the relative similarity between them in union repre-
sentation levels. Whereas in 1980 union representation varied between 30 
to 35% in Canada and over 50% in Australia, New Zealand, and the United 
Kingdom, current overall union representation levels in all four countries 
are around 20 to 30%, with private sector density ranging from 9% in New 
Zealand to 18% in Canada.
The first outlier is Ireland for two reasons. First, the voluntarist nature of 
the system, without union recognition rights, has continued, though the 
public policy suasion for union recognition has declined and industrial ac-
tion has been confined to the enterprise level. Second, Ireland has contin-
ued to have a significant degree of public ordering of employment relations 
through the national partnership agreements. Partnership promoted the 
remarkable success of the Irish economy from 1987 to 2008 and, in turn, 
was sustained by it. Even during this period, however, it was significant that 
the system of truncated partnership combined central coordination of wage 
increases with significant leeway for the private ordering of employment re-
lations at the enterprise level. Within that realm, the minimum employment 
standards play a similar role to those in our other countries, and it is note-
worthy that while public sector union density is approximately 80%, that in 
the private sector is not dissimilar to our other countries at 20%. The ques-
tion for the future is what will be the extent of the impact of the current 
deep economic downturn. This downturn brought the formal centralized 
partnership system to a close at the end of 2009, though informal coordina-
tion has continued. Nevertheless, when combined with signs of increasing 
employer aggression to unions, certainly the potential exists for the system 
to evolve further toward enterprise- level private ordering.
The other outlier is the United States. Structurally its system is similar to 
the other Anglo- American countries in emphasizing private ordering in 
labor law and the role of employment law as being to establish a minimum 
set of basic standards. This U.S. system, however, has involved a general fa-
voring of the interests of employers over those of employees and organized 
labor. In the area of labor law, this favoritism is reflected in the relatively 
weak enforcement of the right to organize and the ability of employers to 
hire permanent replacement workers. In the area of employment law, the 
emphasis on employer interests can be seen in the continued use of the 
employment- at- will rule barring most actions for unfair dismissal and in the 
limited extent of minimum employment standards, such as the lack of paid 
sick leave or vacation entitlements and low minimum wage.
Factors Influencing Convergence
A definitive answer to the question of why there has been a convergence 
across the Anglo- American countries is beyond the scope of this paper, 
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 although we suggest some possible explanations. Note that any explana- 
tion must be able to account for both the divergence of systems across these 
countries before 1980 and the subsequent convergence on the new Anglo- 
American model.
One natural explanation is the shared political and cultural histories of 
these six countries that were at one time part of the British Empire. The 
common linguistic and cultural ties may have facilitated the sharing of ideas 
in the economic and social policy realm, leading to convergence in prac-
tices. More specifically, all six countries retain the common law heritage as 
the basis for their legal systems, which may in turn encourage convergence. 
The main limitation of this explanation is that it does not account for the 
divergence before the 1980s when the heritage was as strong and yet three 
strikingly different employment relations systems existed. This limitation 
suggests that while cultural and linguistic ties may have facilitated transmis-
sion of common economic and social policy ideas in recent decades, such 
ties are not as likely to have operated on their own as the driver of change.
Another possible explanation for convergence is a high degree of inte-
gration of the economies within the three pairings in question. Canada and 
the United States are the world’s largest trading partnership, and their 
closely integrated economies became even more deeply intertwined with 
the 1988 Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agreement and subsequent 1993 North 
American Free Trade Agreement. Similarly, the United Kingdom and Ire-
land have long had closely integrated economies, which are now linked 
through their joint membership in the European Union (EU). Australia 
and New Zealand are similarly linked by the 1983 Australia–New Zealand 
Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement and also have historical eco-
nomic similarities as export- oriented agricultural economies. These factors 
do a good job of explaining the strong parallels within the pairings that ex-
isted in the era before the 1980s, although they do less well in accounting 
for the more recent convergence across the broader set of Anglo- American 
countries. Prior to the entry of the United Kingdom into the EU in 1973 (at 
the time known as the European Economic Community [EEC]), Britain 
served as a major export market for both Australia and New Zealand. Since 
that time the proportion of Australasian exports going to Britain has steadily 
declined. The primary trading partners for Australia and New Zealand are 
now East Asian countries, not other Anglo- American countries. This sug-
gests that economic integration is not likely to be the driver of convergence.
Pressures from globalization of product markets may explain some of the 
convergence. Certainly in the vigorous political debates over reform of the 
employment relations systems in Australia and New Zealand, the need to 
enhance competitiveness in an era of globalization has been a powerful ar-
gument for moving away from the traditional Award systems. Similarly in the 
United Kingdom, competitiveness arguments were some of the concerns 
raised with the earlier, strong trade union–centered Voluntarist system. Fur-
thermore, the extent of product market competition experienced by enter-
prises has played a significant role in the decline of collective bargaining 
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(Brown et al. 2009). Even in the United States, which has seen less change 
in formal laws, the growth of international competition was one of the major 
factors leading to the shift in labor relations practice toward a more strongly 
anti- union approach by many employers (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1994). 
Based on the prominence of these arguments in employment relations re-
form debates across the Anglo- American countries, it would be hard to 
argue that globalization was not an important element in convergence.
Furthermore, the expansion of minimum employment standards can be 
viewed as one governmental response to the decline of collective represen-
tation in an era of heightened global product market competition. Is it in-
evitable, however, that globalization should lead to the particular type of 
convergence on the new Anglo- American model? Interestingly, Ireland is 
one of our outliers even though it has an exceptionally internationally ori-
ented economy. Indeed, its centralized social partnership system was in part 
an effort to establish an economic and policy environment that would en-
hance its international competitiveness and encourage foreign investment 
(Teague and Donaghey 2004). This largely successful effort has been an 
important factor in the Irish economic boom since the 1980s. If the social 
partnership system is unable to survive recent economic turmoil and Ire-
land begins to resemble the new Anglo- American model, an additional 
piece of evidence will have been gained in favor of the globalization and 
international competition explanation for convergence.
A related explanation is that convergence is being driven not by global-
ization per se but rather by the emergence of new systems of work organiza-
tion and human resource practice that are important for competitiveness. 
In the period from the 1980s to the present, we have seen increasing argu-
ments that organizations need to adopt new, more flexible forms of work 
organization to better harness the value of their workforces (Appelbaum 
and Batt 1994). From an industrial relations system perspective this has 
led to arguments about the need to decentralize the determination of em-
ployment terms and conditions to the organizational level to allow for the 
flexibility needed under these systems (Katz 1993). When we look at organi-
zational practices, evidence emerges of common trends toward the adop-
tion of a range of different patterns of work organization and human resource 
management across the countries we are examining (Katz and Darbishire 
2000). As policymakers are faced with this common shift toward a set of or-
ganizational practices designed to achieve competitiveness, they appear to 
be engaging in common policy responses of establishing labor and employ-
ment law systems that facilitate the decentralized implementation of these 
practices.
These arguments are consistent with the VoC perspective that institutional 
complementarities exist and that increasing product market competition 
has been a catalyst for labor law reform. Indeed, even though three models 
existed in 1980, these countries did share a presumption of managerial pre-
rogative at the workplace, even if subject to a negotiated order. The growth 
of a private ordering model remains consistent with this presumption of 
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managerial prerogative implying a possible path dependency even if not 
necessarily a functionalist one. One impact, certainly, has been to constrain 
the ability to generate enterprise- level partnerships: Concerted attempts, 
most particularly in Ireland and New Zealand, to build high- wage, high- skill 
relationships have come to little. Nevertheless, significant variation remains 
in the economic performance among our six countries that is not entirely 
consistent with the functionalist and systemic logic of the VoC model. Fur-
thermore, we note that in Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom 
a policy “overshooting” in the form of a more extreme model of deregu-
lated labor markets existed, premised on rationalist economic arguments, 
before the current models were adopted.
The similarity of policy responses across these countries also displays 
structural isomorphism (Amable 2003) as a result of the significant inter-
change of economic and social ideas. Commonality in heritage and politi-
cal institutions may have facilitated the spread of the specific set of labor 
and employment practices that these countries adopted in response to the 
pressures of globalization and the advent of new systems of work organiza-
tion, while also legitimating political policy preferences. The institutional 
borrowing has a clear history, as the United Kingdom unsuccessfully at-
tempted to restructure its industrial relations system along the Wagner Act 
model in 1971 (Gould 1972). Certainly the spread of neoliberal economic 
ideas in the Anglo- American world received a major boost from the politi-
cal success of Thatcher in the United Kingdom and Reagan in the United 
States. The influences were both philosophical and empirical. In the United 
Kingdom the economic rationalist arguments of Friedrich Hayek were par-
ticularly important (Wedderburn 1988), while in New Zealand Richard 
 Epstein held sway (Dannin 1997). The moves toward deregulated labor 
markets in 1991 with the ECA in New Zealand arguably owed much to the 
perceived successes of the Reagan and Thatcher programs in the United 
States and the United Kingdom, while states in Australia such as Western 
Australia and Victoria drew heavily on the New Zealand experience, fur-
ther influencing the Howard administration’s goals leading up to the 2005 
Work Choices Act.
The retreats from the neoliberal extremes also illustrate the transmission 
of policy ideas among the Anglo- American countries. The statutory recogni-
tion system in the United Kingdom borrows features of the North American 
Wagner Act model, particularly the more union- friendly Canadian variant, 
though adapted to fit the voluntarist industrial relations legacy. The experi-
ence of New Zealand with the ERA showed significant policy learning with 
regards to Wagner Act good- faith bargaining provisions. Australia did like-
wise with the Fair Work Act for recognition and good faith, while seeking to 
avoid the perceived legalism and employer hostility of the United States 
(Forsyth 2007). The significance of agency is also illustrated by the case of 
Ireland, where the principal political parties are not divided on ideological 
grounds and the partnership approach was adopted at a point of economic 
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crisis in 1987 with the deliberate attempt to avoid the neoliberal solution 
then being implemented in the United Kingdom. The success of this move 
ensured there was no challenge over the next 22 years.
The development of employment laws and minimum employment stan-
dards has similarly been influenced by cross- national borrowing among our 
countries, which is illustrated by three examples: the United Kingdom’s 
minimum wage design influenced both Australia and Ireland; the United 
Kingdom’s paid parental leave policy was an important influence in policy 
discussions leading up to Australia’s first paid parental leave law (Baird 
2003); and the United Kingdom’s “right to request” flexible working policy 
has been the model for Australia and New Zealand (Hegewisch 2009). The 
United States, meanwhile, has served as a model in regard to employment 
discrimination (McCallum 2007). The proposed Employee Free Choice Act 
that labor groups in the United States attempted to pass largely involved 
adopting a set of provisions taken from Canadian labor law, such as card 
check recognition and first contract arbitration. This suggests that while the 
heritage of the Anglo- American countries is not an originating cause of the 
recent convergence, it may serve as an important intermediary variable ex-
plaining why there was convergence on a common set of policy responses to 
a new set of economic pressures.
Conclusion
We have argued that the last three decades have seen the emergence of a 
new Anglo- American model of employment relations. Whereas prior to 
1980 there was substantial divergence across this set of countries, over time 
there has been growing convergence on a model characterized by two main 
features. The first aspect is the emphasis on private ordering in labor rela-
tions, in which the role of laws and institutions governing collective repre-
sentation is to support and encourage decentralized determination of the 
terms and conditions of employment at the organizational level. The sec-
ond aspect is the emphasis on the role of employment law to establish a 
minimum basket of standards from which employees and employers can 
negotiate upward. What is striking beyond these two general principles is 
the increasing degree of convergence on many of the specific rules and fea-
tures of labor and employment relations across many of the Anglo- American 
countries. The incidence of union representation, the level of minimum 
terms and conditions, and many specific features of the law are similar in 
the various countries. Within this picture, the relative exceptionalism of the 
United States is noteworthy in its limited extent of union representation, 
weaker union rights, and much more limited minimum employment stan-
dards. Our discussion of the new Anglo- American model has been descrip-
tive and analytical in nature, rather than normative. To the degree that 
transmissions of policy ideas across these countries has had a substantial 
normative role in driving recent changes, however, it is worth considering 
 at CORNELL UNIV on June 30, 2015ilr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
1074 ILRREVIEW
whether the policy elements being adopted in the new model in the other 
Anglo- American countries will begin to feature in labor and employment 
law reform debates in coming years in the United States.
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